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When studying consumption choices, economists have often relied on the
abstraction of a representative agent. Such an agent can indeed be shown to
exist and to replicate the aggregate consumers' demand under standard, but
not necessarily convincing assumptions (Kirman (1992)). There was also a
justiable reluctance to introducing heterogeneous preferences, as such a step
may seem ad hoc when trying to explain dierent consumption behaviors.
The rise of empirical studies based on micro data has opened new perspec-
tives. The micro-economic importance of uninsurable risks is now recog-
nized, and threatens the foundations of the representative agent hypothesis
often used in macroeconomics.. The continuing controversies surrounding the
question of individual attitudes towards risk has motivated many empirical
studies and observations; most of them conclude to a bewildering diversity
of individual preferences1
This paper proposes to check the conditions under which heterogeneous
individual attitudes toward risk can be non-parametrically identied from
discrete data on choices under risk. Our main result establishes that given
data that is usually available (essentially market shares of the dierent op-
tions, plus the realizations of the nal outcomes of agents), the analyst can
recover the whole distribution of individual preferences if this can be indexed
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1See Barsky et al., 1997; Cohen and Einav 2002; Guiso and Paiella 2006; Chiappori
and Paiella 2007; and Choi et al (2007).
1condition holds. We then discuss several applications of our general method-
ology.
1 Theory
We consider an economic situation in which a population of privately in-
formed agents face a nite menu of prospects. In this section, we assume
that for the econometrician this population appears homogeneous. Equiva-
lently, the econometrician has data on a bigger population, including some
variables X describing the population under study and the subgroup we con-
sider here appears homogeneous because we control for the values of X.
The economic model Agents are heterogeneous; each agent is charac-
terized by some parameter , his type, which is his private information.
Because of asymmetric information, all agents are proposed the same nite
menu C = fc1;:::;cng. Each prospect ci in this set can be thought of as a
lottery (or a `bet'), which in practice may be an insurance contract, a job pro-
posal, or any choice involving risky outcomes. There is a set of consequences
M  Rk, a typical element of which is a real vector m; lotteries on this set
are characterized by their c.d.f. F. By assumption, agents only care about
consequences, so that we endow each agent with preferences represented by




but we do not require this assumption; in fact, we will put much stress on
identifying possible departures from expected utility in the population of
agents.
When faced with the menu C of prospects, agent  associates a distri-
bution F(:jci;) to each feasible choice ci, i = 1;:::;n; note, in particular,
that the (perceived) probability distribution induced by a given action may
depend on the agent's type, as would be the case for instance when riskiness
is agent-specic. Given the agent's preferences W, she will choose the option
that gives the highest value to V (ci;) = W(F(:jci;);), which yields a
choice function C(;C).
This model of choice is very general, indeed so much so that we can-
not make much progress without specializing it. In this paper we discuss
the one-dimensional case with single-crossing. So we take  to be a scalar,
2whose distribution we normalize to be uniform over [0;1]2; and we assume
the existence of a complete ordering  of prospects such that:
Single Crossing Assumption (SC): for any  < 
0 and any pair of
prospects c  c0,
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The Single Crossing Assumption is standard. It states, in our context,
that one can rank the prospects of the menu C in such a way that agents with
a higher type prefer prospects with a higher rank. One may, for instance,
identify  to a risk preference parameter, and rank prospects by increasing
risk. Then our assumption requires, rst, that the diversity of preferences be
accounted for by a single parameter; and, second, that they can be ranked
globally by decreasing dislike for risk. But our setting can accommodate
other interpretations. For instance, in a non expected utility framework, 
could index some deformation of probability; alternatively, we may think of a
model entailing robust control  a la Hansen-Sargent (2007), and  could then
indicate the cost the agent put on probability distortions3
Without loss of generally, we may assume that the ranking characterized
in the SC Assumption is the natural one - i.e., ci  cj if and only if i < j.
Note also that the single-crossing condition bears on a complex object, as
the type  may enter both preferences and distributions of consequences. We
will discuss subcases below.
1.1 The Data
Ideally, we would like to recover the distribution of preferences W(F;) over
the set of types. Obviously this requires at a minimum that we observe the
same population repeatedly, as it makes choices in dierent menus. We index
each such observation by the proposed menu C, and we also assume that for
each observation the econometrician observes
 the market share si(C) of each prospect: so that we have
si (C) = Pr[C (;C) = i]
2If  is distributed according to some C.d.f. , then   = () is uniformly distributed
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3We could also forgo preference heterogeneity and focus on heterogeneity of risk for
instance in a model of insurance under adverse selection.
3 the empirical distribution of m, for each prospect:
Gi (m j C)) = E [F(m j ci;) j i = C(;C)]:
Several remarks are in order here. First, we have to justify why the same
population is observed facing dierent menus; this clearly requires that there
exist an unmodelled, but exogeneous shock on the supply side. Think for
example of the population of betters in a horse race on Sundays, or of young
male drivers in rural regions trying to nd a bargain for their car insurance
contract. In both cases it seems reasonable to assume that the distribution
of preferences remains the same from Sundays to Sundays, or from a region
to another. In the rst case menus dier because dierent horses in dierent
races have dierent winning probabilities. In the second case menus may
vary from a region to another because loading factors dier, reecting for
instance various levels of competition across insurers by regions.
The assumption on the observability of market shares needn't be dis-
cussed. On the other hand, the second equality above requires that agents
have correct beliefs when making their choices. For instance, if we analyze
insurance contracts, we are requiring that an agent takes decisions based on
the true distribution of claims conditional on (ci;). Such an assumption can-
not be avoided : barring data on beliefs, most datasets could be rationalized
by assigning strange beliefs to agents.
Finally, let us underline that the econometrician does not need to observe
the dierent menus, nor the precise reason why these menus dier|as long
as it does not have any impact on the preferences or the riskiness of agents.
1.2 Identication
The beauty of single-crossing, as shown in hundreds of papers since Mirrlees
(1971), is that it yields segmentation: given a menu C, agents with a higher
 will choose prospects with a higher rank. Then we can dene a sequence
of numbers i(C) for i = 1;:::;n   1 such that4:
 0(C) = 0
 n(C) = 1
 prospect i 2 f1;:::;ng is chosen by the set of types
 2 [i 1(C);i(C)]:
4Recall that  has support in [0;1].
4In particular, the type i(C) is dened by the property that such agents
are just indierent between choices ci and ci+1. By single crossing, all agents
with a type above i(C) strictly prefer ci+1 over ci, while types below i(C)
have the opposite preference.
Since we normalized the distribution of types to be uniform in [0;1], the
market share of prospect i among agents is:
si(C) = i(C)   i 1(C)





We may thus assume that for each menu C, the econometrician knows the
indices of types indierent between two consecutive prospects.
Similarly, we can rewrite the estimated distribution of consequences as




Now consider the subset of observations whose menu includes the prospect
ci. Assume that this subset is \large enough", in the sense that the support
of the distribution of (i 1(C);i(C)) is [0;1]  [0;1]. Since, for each such
observation, we know the values of the bounds in the integral, and the func-
tion to be integrated is the same, we can recover from the data the value
of the function F(m j ci;), for any m and any  such that there exists an
observation in which  indeed chooses ci.
Finally, we know that for any menu C and for any i we have
W [F (: j ci;i(C));i(C)] = W [F (: j ci+1;i(C));i(C)]
Now x a value for  and the prospect ci|say,   and  c. Consider the
subgroup of observations for which   is indierent between  c and the next
prospect|technically, the set of menus C such that ci =  c and i(C) =  .
Intuitively, each such observation provides a point on the indierence curve
of  that goes through F(: j c;). Provided such observations display enough
variation, one can identify the indierence curves of agent , and thus her
preferences up to an increasing transform.
Our present goal is to introduce a general methodology. Consequently,
we shall not attempt at a general statement of the necessary conditions for
identication; it is much easier to illustrate them on specic examples. Suf-
ces to say that, in many cases, the corresponding assumptions are fairly
simple. Moreover, the single-crossing assumption can be tested, as well as
other features of our model.
52 Applications
We now turn to a few selected examples.
2.1 Parimutuel Horse Betting
Let us start with parimutuel betting on horse races, which we study in much
more detail in a companion paper (Chiappori et al., 2008). With betting, we
typically do not have bettor-level data; on the other hand, we can observe
odds of each horse in a very large number of races, along with the results
of the race. The former gives us information on the preferences of bettors,
as odds result from a simple market mechanism; and the latter informs us
on the distribution of consequences of bets. To make this clear, consider the
market for \win bets" in a race with n horses. Each bettor chooses on which
horse he wants to bet a xed amount. The odds is the net return from a
winning bet: if a bettor bets $1 on horse i, his nal wealth is increased by
$Ri if i wins, and reduced by $1 if i loses.
Bets on races may be organized by bookmakers, as in Jullien-Salani e
(2000); but parimutuel data are more useful for our purposes, as odds then
mechanically reect the market shares of horses. In parimutuel races, the
money bet is placed in a pool; the organizers of the race (and/or the taxman)
receive a share t known as the \take", and the lucky betters share what is
left in the pool. Hence market shares (si) and odds (Ri) are related by the
simple equality




and the value of t can be deduced from the fact that
P
i si = 1.
Observe also that if we properly control for observables, the winning
probability of horse i in a race with odds (R1,..,Rn) can only be a func-
tion of these odds, since bettors only care about consequences5. Hence this
probability pi(R1;:::;Rn) can be computed as the empirical frequency of the
event \horse i wins", on the subset of races with such odds (assuming a large
enough data set.)
We can now apply our theoretical work to horse races. The rst step is to
partition the set of races into dierent subsets; within each subset (e.g., races
held on weekdays on a particular track), we assume that the population of
bettors is the same in each race6
5This does not need to be true if odds are set by oligopolistic bookmakers, since they
may set odds that depend on other considerations, such as the existence of other races.
Under parimutuel betting, such a problem does not arise.
6We leave self-selection of bettors for further work.
6Then we have to specify what agents know for each race; this is not an
easy task here, as information on horses is typically dispersed across betters,
and odds are not known until the beginning of the race since they result from
the amounts bet. We rely here on a result by Gandhi (2008), which shows
that if the pooled information of the agents pins down the actual probabili-
ties, then there is a unique fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
Assuming that this equilibrium prevails, we obtain that beliefs will be cor-
rect in equilibrium, as if all betters knew the probabilities pi(R1;:::;Rn) and
the odds (R1;:::;Rn). Using the previous notation, we see that a menu the
menu oered to betters is simply C = f(p1;R1);:::;(pn;Rn)g (each horse
ci being characterized by a probability of winning and a payment in case
of success). The distribution of the nal monetary outcome, F(m j c;), is
simply a binomial distribution in general independent of 7 : given i and C,
m = Ri with probability pi, and m =  1 with probability (1   pi).
As agents only care for consequences, we can thus write
V (ci;) = V (Ri;pi;):
Chiappori et al. (2008) then use a simple condition on V to ensure that
single-crossing holds : agents with higher types  must dislike risk less (in
a precise sense that ts this non-expected utility framework). As a conse-
quence, one can identify the whole distribution of preferences.
This application has several features that greatly simplify matters. First,
the particular rules of parimutuel betting limits the need for data; odds allow
to directly recover market shares and the take. Second, barring probability
deformation, the distribution of consequences of a bet on a horse does not
depend on the type  of the bettor, but only on the odds of the horse Ri and
on the probability pi that the horse wins. As a consequence, it is very easy
to identify the probability distribution on consequences from the data. Note,
however, that more complex models can also be estimated in this framework;
for instance, the decision criteria may entail non expected utility criteria that
are not linear in probability, in which case the perceived distribution may
depend on . Again, the reader is referred to Chiappori et al. (2008) for
precise results and proofs.
2.2 Compensating Wage Dierences
A very similar framework can be applied to the analysis of the statistical
value of human life. Book I of the Wealth of Nations already emphasized
7Note, however, that the initial wealth of an agent can be part of his type .
7that
[...] the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the
cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness,
of the employment.
A fortiori, Rosen (1988) emphasized that the wage dierential needed to
compensate a higher probability of accidental death allows to estimate the
value of life. It has been extensively used subsequently (see for instance
Viscusi and Alduy 2003). In all studies, however, homogeneity is a crucial
prerequisite; i.e., identication relies on the rather doubtful assumption that
all workers have the same monetary valuation of their life.
Our approach suggests that this assumption is simply not needed. Specif-
ically, assume that agents are faced with a menu of jobs, each of which is
dened by a wage and some parameters related to its riskiness; to keep things
simple, let us simply assume that the risk is a xed probability of a lethal
accident, and that the latter can be estimated from data on the distribution
of accidents in each job i. Also, let  index the value that any given agent
assigns to his life; that is, the value of agent 's life is some v () with v (0)
corresponding to a minimum level (say zero) and v (1) to some upper bound.
Here, a job ci = (wi;pi) is fully dened by a wage wi and a death probability
pi. The resulting probability distribution F(m j c;) is again a binomial
distribution. An agent choosing the job i in the available menu C receives
m = wi with probability 1 pi, and m =   with probability (1   pi). These
parameters can readily be identied from available data on average casualty
rate per job; also, the natural ranking is by increasing risk (and wage).
Considering now the estimation of preferences, we may start with the
simplest case of risk neutral agents (which, incidentally, is the only one con-
sidered in the literature); then i (C) is dened by:
(1   pi)wi + piv (i (C)) = (1   pi+1)wi+1 + pi+1v (i (C))
therefore
v (i (C)) =
(1   pi)wi   (1   pi+1)wi+1
pi+1   pi
and the function v is exactly identied. Note that the single crossing condi-
tion is obviously satised in that case.
We may however go one step further, by assuming rst that individuals
are characterized by some common utility u that is concave in monetary
rewards. The equation becomes:
(1   pi)u(wi) + piv (i (C)) = (1   pi+1)u(wi+1) + pi+1v (i (C))
8Now, assume we can observe dierent menus in which the same agent
  is pivotal between the same job ( p;  w) and dierent alternatives (p;w).
Then it must be the case that for all these alternatives, the expected utility
(1   p)u(w) + pv
  

is constant (this is the 'indierence curve' mentioned
above). In practice, if these various alternatives describe a wage/probability


































which identies both u and v up to a common multiplicative constant and
also generates strong overidentifying restrictions.
Finally, we may also introduce heterogeneous utilities by allowing u to
depend on , although the single crossing condition will then have to be
tested ex post.
The intuition of this example is clear. While the existing literature tends
to pick up arbitrarily one type of risky job and estimate the statistical value
of life from this unique source under the assumption of identical consumers,
we suggest that additional mileage could be obtained form the respective
\market shares" of various dangerous professions.
2.3 Insurance and portfolio choice
As a third possible application, consider the choice of an insurance contract|
a topic already studied by Chiappori and Salani e (2008) and Cohen and Einav
(2002) among others. Here, a contract is, in the simplest case, dened by a
pair consisting of a premium and a xed deductible. The distribution induced
by a particular choice may be more complex than before, since it needn't
be binomial: losses incurred by the agent can in principle take any value
below the deductible - although several applied papers actually disregard
this issue, certainly an acceptable simplication when the deductible is low.
In any case, it can, as before, be identied from available data on accident
realizations (and possibly conditional losses); this has actually been done in
several papers.
The next step is to study individual demand for specic contracts. This
task, again, has been performed in a few existing papers, although our ap-
proach introduces an important innovation. Specically, existing work heav-
ily relies on parametric assumptions on preferences (e.g., CARA expected
9utility). However, it follows from the previous discussions that the shape of
individual preferences as a function of the heterogeneity parameter  can be
non parametrically identied, by a procedure close to (although more gen-
eral than) the one just described. Again, the crucial requirement is that
similar agents must be faced with dierent menus of contracts, which implies
a source of contract variation that is orthogonal to individual preferences.
Fortunately, the existence of such variations seems well established empiri-
cally.
In the literature, two types of heterogeneity have been considered so far.
One is heterogeneity in risks. In such frameworks, agents have identical pref-
erences but dierent accident probabilities, and the choice of an insurance
contract partly reects information about idiosyncratic risk. The vast empir-
ical literature on asymmetric information in insurance, starting with Chiap-
pori and Salani e (2000), belongs to this class. Unlike the previous examples,
in these models the distribution of probability over outcomes, F (: j ci;),
does depend on  (which is correlated with risk) as well as ci (say, because
of ex ante or ex post moral hazard). Estimating this relationship is often
the dicult part of the empirical analysis; clearly, the availability of dif-
ferent menus is crucial here. On the other hand, once the function F has
been recovered, estimating the (common) utility from contract choices is usu-
ally simpler. Alternatively, one can consider a model in which agents have
homogeneous risks (at least conditional on the information available to the
insurer),8 but dier in their preferences. Then F does not depend on  (which
is now interpreted, for instance, as a risk aversion parameter), and can readily
be recovered from data on claims.9 Heterogeneity is mainly reected in con-
tract choices; the single crossing condition typically expresses that more risk
averse agents always prefer more comprehensive coverage, a property most
models will satisfy. Again, one can then try to non parametrically estimate
the (heterogeneous) shape of individual preferences form available data.
An obvious limitation of our approach, in the case of insurance contracts,
is the one dimensionality of the heterogeneity parameter . Strictly speaking,
it requires either that individuals only dier in their risk or their risk aversion
(but not both); or, if both dimensions are allowed to vary in the population,
that there exists a perfect correlation between them, so that the resulting
heterogeneity can be represented by one index only. While this setting is
very restrictive, it is still possible to nd interesting theoretical frameworks
that are compatible with it. For instance, in Jullien, Salani e and Salani e
8Regarding automobile insurance, for instance, many insurers tend to believe that if
anything, they have a much better knowledge of a client's risk than the client himself.
9However, the decision to le a claim may be endogenous, and possibly correlated with
risk aversion; say Chiappori et al (2006) for a discussion.)
10(2007), agents can exert an eort to reduce their accident probability, and
heterogeneous attitudes to risk result in dierent eort levels, therefore dif-
ferent realized risks. In that context, a (one dimensional) distribution of risk
aversion generates heterogeneity in both risk and contract choices conditional
on risk.
Finally, the same logic can be extended beyond the strict connes of
insurance. For instance, most work on portfolio choice uses continuous mod-
els, in which the proportions of the various asset classes can be freely varied.
In many cases, however, the choice faced by individuals is much simpler.
When electing a pension plan, for instance, many households are oered
a small number of preexisting plans, and the choice is essentially discrete
(even though continuous parameters can sometimes be varied in a given
plan). Plans may dier in many respects: riskiness, liquidity, geographical
coverage and others. To the extent that the heterogeneity between agents'
preferences regarding these plans can be assumed to be one-dimensional (and
satisfy the single crossing condition), our approach can be useful. Here, the
'consequences' can be any performance measure (expected return, volatility,
beta,...) that can be estimated from the data; and the shape of (heteroge-
neous) preferences can be estimated, provided again that similar agents are
faced with dierent menus of pension plans for exogenous reasons, say the
employer's policy toward employees' retirement.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a general methodology for estimating heteroge-
neous preferences in situations of discrete choice under risk. Our key re-
quirements are (i) that the existing heterogeneity can be summarized in a
one-dimensional parameter, and (ii) that there exists some exogenous source
of variation in the menus faced by the agents. Neither of these assump-
tions is innocuous. It should however be stressed that they typically allow
a non parametric identication of the distribution of preferences (or risks);
moreover, they are empirically testable, and actually generate strong overi-
dentifying restrictions. Empirical work currently in progress should give us
a better understanding of their relevance.
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